Complaint 2

1 June 2004

1. On the 14th July 1998, an application for planning permission for the erection of one stable, at Walk Lane, Irby upon Humber, N E Lincolnshire, was made to North East Lincolnshire Council. This application was approved with conditions on the 8th September 1998 - Planning Application (DC/675/98/WOL) (Appendix 1).

1.1 In November 2001, Mr Webb sought the services of Mr Stephen Brown of Land and Development Consultants in Lincoln. Mr Brown was employed to amend Condition 5 within Planning Application (DC/675/98/WOL). Condition 5 stipulated that the stable was to remain ancillary to Planning Application (08/93/0529) (Appendix 2). It was Mr Brown's intention to amend Condition 5 to Mr Webb's home (The Barns, Walk Lane, Irby upon Humber).

1.2 On the 25th January 2002, Mr Brown had written to the LPA enclosing a planning application and fee, asking to amend Condition 5 within Planning Application (DC/675/98/WOL) (Appendix 3). "W" replied to Mr Brown's letter on the 18th February 2002 stating she could not accept the application and consequently returned the planning application and fee. She also added it would be inappropriate to vary the conditions, as in her opinion, Planning Application (08/93/0529) no longer existed and that a new application must be submitted to the LPA, if they were to consider the stable (Appendix 4).

1.3 On the 21st February 2002, Mr Brown replied to "W"'s letter stating that it was not unreasonable to apply for variation of Conditions 5 and 6 and asked her for further comment (Appendix 5). Again, on the 14th March 2002, Mr Brown wrote to "W" for a reply to his letter dated 21st February 2002 (Appendix 6).

1.4 During the next weeks, Mr Brown had made contact with "W" by telephone and raised the matters he outlined in his letters to her. Again, "W" was not responsive and Mr Brown then sent an email message to her and again asked for a response to his letter dated 21st February 2002. Mr Brown then received an email from "W" on the 16th April 2002, explaining that she agreed that she had spoken with Mr Brown by telephone but was unwilling to confirm any action on behalf of the LPA, unless Mr Brown could provide exact details (Appendix 7).

1.5 Mr Brown again sent a further letter to "W" on the 22nd April 2002 and made it quite clear to her that he thought he was quite explicit in his letter dated the 21st February 2002 (Appendix 8). On the 14th May 2002, Mr Brown then received a letter from "W" stating that it was the LPA's view that if a stable was to be erected, then a fresh detailed planning application must be made with no reference to the existing stable Planning Application (DC/675/98/WOL) (Appendix 9).

1.6 Mr Brown once more, sent a further letter to the LPA on the 6th June 2002, stating that it would be reasonable to amend Conditions 5 and 6 of Planning Application (DC/675/98/WOL) under Section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act (TCPA) 1990. Mr Brown also asked for confirmation of the receipt of the planning application and the determination of the application at their earliest convenience (Appendix 10).

1.7 Again, on the 15th July 2002 Mr Brown had sent another letter to the LPA to ask for clarification of the situation since they had not responded to his letter dated the 6th June 2002 (Appendix 11).

1.8 On the 24th July 2002, Mr Brown received a reply from "W" stating that she had taken legal advice from the Council’s legal department and would now allow the amendment to proceed as submitted (Appendix 12). Although "W" had now accepted the application, the application was predated back to the 7th June 2002 but quite clearly shows the form dated 22nd July 2002, less than two weeks away from the statutory 8 week determination period (Appendix 13).

1.9 On the 28th August 2002, Mr Webb called the LPA by the telephone and asked whether or not the stable amendment had been refused, as Mr Webb had not received confirmation. Mr Webb was then asked to speak with "H" (Senior Planning Officer) who was now dealing with the application. On speaking with "H", she claimed she had no knowledge of what was been discussed and that she would call Mr Webb back when she was in receipt of the planning application file. "H" returned Mr Webb's telephone call and stated that the application had not been determined and was ongoing. She continued by saying that she would proceed with the planning application and would make a site visit the next day for inspection and erect a public notice.

1.10 On the 1st September 2002, whilst outside his property at Walk Lane, Mr Webb noticed a public notice on a signpost in front of his home. The public notice referred to the stable and its application for variation of Conditions 5 and 6. The LPA had not referred to the applicant (Mr Webb) personally on the notice but to his business "The Kensington Residential Home" (Appendix 14). On finding this notice and its content, Mr Webb then contacted Mr Brown the following day and explained to him on what he had discovered. Mr Brown then called "H" the very same day and she assured Mr Brown that the notice would be taken down and replaced with a correct notice.

1.11 A letter was sent by Mr Webb to "R", asking him to explain "W"'s comments made to Mr Brown, in her letter dated 24th July 2002 (Appendix 15).

1.12 After several attempts, Mr Brown managed to speak with "H" on the 27th September 2002 and asked her on how the planning application was progressing (Appendix 16). "H" confirmed that material objections had been received and therefore the application would be presented before the planning committee for their deliberation on the 25th October 2002. She also confirmed this to Mrs Webb when she called "H" by telephone on the 3rd October 2002.

1.13 Due to the length of time taken by the LPA and their handling this application, Mr Webb began to seek legal help. Mr Steven Hawkins of Rollits Solicitors in Hull, who specializes in planning law, was sought to help Mr Webb with his application. On the 14th October 2002, Mr Webb met with Mr Hawkins to discuss the application. On the very same day, on Mr Hawkins advice, Mr Webb visited the LPA department and asked to view the planning application file. In the knowledge of the letters from a neighbour and the Local Parish Council, Mr Webb asked to view them, as they were not present in the file. "H" then attended the reception and produced the letters. She also explained that the application would now be determined by delegated powers on the 18th October 2002 having discussed it with her colleagues.

1.14 Mr Webb then explained to "H" that the application could not be dealt with under delegated powers as she was in receipt of a material objection from the neighbour and that the Local Parish Council’s letter was one of observation and not objection. Therefore the application would have to be referred to the Planning Committee for deliberation. "H" stated that the matter of decision was one of a delegation only and would not be presented to the Planning Committee. Later that afternoon, Mr Webb informed Mr Hawkins of "H"'s comments. Mr Hawkins then sent a facsimile to "H" on the 17th October 2002, stating that the LPA were unable to determine the application under delegated powers as they had been silenced and must present it to the Planning Committee (Appendix 17).

1.15 On the 12th November 2002, Mr Hawkins was informed by "H" that the application was now going before the Planning Committee on the 15th November 2002. Mr Hawkins then asked to see a copy of "H"'s Case Report (Appendix 18). Mr Webb then contacted the local authority in order to register his intentions of publicly speaking at the planning meeting on the 15th November 2002. Mr Hawkins then replied to "H" by facsimile on 12th November 2002 and questioned her comments within her report and asked for copies of his letter to be distributed amongst the Planning Committee for their perusal (Appendix 19).

1.16 At the Planning Committee meeting on the 15th November 2002, Mr Webb was allowed to address the Planning Committee in his allocated time of 5 minutes in order to support his application. Mr Webb read out his pre-written statement to the meeting (Appendix 20). Mr Webb stated to the meeting that he believed that the 3 Reasons for Refusal by the LPA were not lawful additions to the reason of Condition 5 of the planning permission. At the meeting, the LPA was represented by "P", Development Control Manager. Firstly, he described the Planning Application (DC/675/98/WOL) as "we thought that this application was dead". He continued to say that the application before the Planning Committee was "nothing more than a ploy by a solicitor to resurrect the application". "P" then referred to Planning Application (08/93/0529) to which the stable permission was conditionally tied to, as "never built". He then placed a plan upon a projector with no scale evident and began to describe the application "as you can see it is a large building" and "it looks like a bungalow".

1.17 A request was made to the Law and Democratic Services department for a copy of the planning committee meeting minutes held on the 15th November 2002 (Appendix 21). Having studied those minutes, Mr Webb sent a further letter to "L" (Law and Democratic Services Officer) (Appendix 22). Mr Webb expressed his concerns as he felt that the minutes did not reflect an accurate and fair record of that meeting in relation to Mr Webb's planning application. Mr Webb concluded in his letter, that he hoped that the minutes would be revised to show an accurate record. Mr Webb later received a reply from "K" (Law and Democratic Services Officer) on the 16th January 2003 (Appendix 23). "K" pointed out that he was satisfied with the minutes of the meeting on reflection of the meetings transpiration. In dismay, Mr Webb responded to "K"'s letter and sent a letter to him dated 20th January 2003 (Appendix 24), Mr Webb made it quite evident that if Council Officer's are able to change the minutes to reflect their contribution to the meeting, then members of the public should also be afforded the same right.

1.18 Mr Brown, within Sections 1 to 1.7 of this complaint, is perfectly justified in asking for the variation of Planning Application (DC/675/98/WOL) to develop the land without compliance of conditions previously attached, namely Condition 5. Section 73 (1) of The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 permits applications for planning permission for the development of land without complying with conditions subject to which a previous planning permission was granted. An application under Section 73 only seeks the removal or variation of conditions in a previous planning permission that has not lapsed. Planning Application (DC/675/98/WOL) had not lapsed, therefore Mr Brown was within the scope of The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to make such an application. "W"'s demand in January 2002 of a new planning application is therefore unwarranted and unjustified.

1.19 The Council’s Development Control Charter (Sections 8 and 9) (Appendix 25) states that each planning application will be acknowledged within 3 working days of receipt and any incomplete or invalid applications will be notified to the applicant within 10 working days with an explanation of how this can be corrected. It had clearly taken "W" 24 days to, firstly, acknowledge the application and secondly, return what she claimed was an invalid application. This is evidently a breach of the Charter causing maladministration.

1.20 It is evident that between the dates of the 25th January 2002 and the 24th July 2002 (approximately 24 weeks), "W" was willfully uncooperative and obstructive in her recognition of the application under Section 73 of The Town and Country Planning Act 1990. She has also disregarded the Council’s Development Control Charter, in the time taking to respond or acknowledge correspondence from other parties in their repetitive requests for information. Section 5 of the Charter states, "If advice is sought by letter a response will be made within 10 working days." This is also maladministration and injustice.

1.21 In a document supplied by "I" in March 2004 to Mr Webb, it is quite evident that "W" had sought the services of a North East Lincolnshire Council Solicitor with regards to the application. On or around 7th July 2002, she sent an email message to "J", Commercial Solicitor. She describes my agent, Mr Brown, to "J" in a derogative way by stating he, "wants to apply to vary 2 conditions on a planning approval and we don't think he is able to do so and he wont take no for an answer." As discussed in Section 2.18 of this complaint, Mr Brown was entitled to make an application to vary those conditions and stated this fact since January 2002. Her terminology within the email indicate her vindictiveness towards Mr Webb's agent Mr Brown and she further implicates that on this issue alone, she did not act independently. This claim of vindictiveness is also supported by a letter sent by Mr Brown to "W" on 22nd April 2002 (Appendix 26 - LPA's copy in the Planning Register). In handwritten notes on the bottom of Mr Brown's letter she states, "If they want to make a planning application for a new stable then we cannot stop them but it must be an entirely fresh application." In his reply on 8th July 2002, the Commercial Solicitor stated that she was unable to prevent the application for reasons that will be discussed later in this complaint.

1.22 "W"'s acceptance of the application on the 24th July 2002, some 2 weeks later after her discussion with the Council’s Commercial Solicitor, is undermined by the fact that the application had been predated back to 7th June 2002 (Appendix 27). Mr Brown had written to the LPA on the 6th June 2002 (Section 1.6 of this complaint) and requested a reply at their early convenience. The issue of notification of the acceptance of the application was received some 6 weeks later. "W", as an Officer of the Council carrying out her duties prescribed by planning legislation and policies and procedures set down by the Council, is obligated to and shall as soon as is reasonably practicable send to the applicant an acknowledgement of the application in the terms (or substantially in the terms) set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure (GDPO)) Order 1995. Six weeks is therefore in breach of the GDPO 1995 as this was an unreasonable amount of time taken by "W" to inform Mr Webb's agent and is also contrary to Section 8 of the Council’s Development Control Charter that states, "Each application will be acknowledged within 3 working days of receipt."

1.23 In Section 1.0 of this complaint, "H" stated that application for planning permission was on-going despite contravening Article 20 of the GDPO 1995 as a decision was not received within the statutory 8-week determination period beginning 7th June 2002. No agreement had been made as to the extension of further time as prescribed by Article 20. Not only had "H" disregarded the GDPO 1995 but also such a decision was also contrary to Section 15 of the Council’s Development Control Charter that States, "If an application cannot be dealt within 8 weeks, the reason will be explained and a request made for an extension of time."

1.24 Section 1.1 of this complaint quite clearly shows the events surrounding the site notice. The applicant for the amendment of permission (DC/675/98/WOL) was the owner of application site. By virtue of Article 6 of the GDPO 1995, a Certificate A was enclosed with the planning application. Certificate A purports that on the 21 days before the date of application, nobody except the applicant was the owner of any part of the land to which the application relates. The application was presented in the name of "C Webb" (Appendix 27), pursuant to the GDPO 1995. The application at no time made any reference to "The Kensington Residential Home". The only relevance to "The Kensington Residential Home" was the applicable fee required by The Town and Country Planning (Fees for Applications and Deemed Applications) Regulations 1989, in the form of a business cheque held in that particular business name and nothing more. Despite requests to "H", this notice was never replaced and remained throughout the extended application period despite her assurances to Mr Brown. Mr Webb believes that this was a deliberate attempt by "H" to provoke public consternation of his planning application, as to purport it as one of commercial rather than residential.

1.25 Despite the neighbours letter of objection to the proposed variation of planning conditions of Planning Application (DC/675/98/WOL), which were material planning considerations in this application, "H" tried to determine the application by delegated powers. Mr Webb was initially over-ridden, despite his contention to "H" about her decision. This was in breach of the Council’s Constitution under Article 13 - Delegated Powers to the Head of Development and Environmental Protection. "G", as Head of Development and Environmental Protection, confers the power, along with other named officers within his department, to exercise all the planning and associated functions of Planning Committee together with the additional delegated powers and reservations. He and his delegated officers can determine (approval or refusal) minor amendments submitted following previous grants of planning permission where it accords but when a material planning objection has been submitted in writing, as the neighbour at Hilltop House did, then he and his delegated officers powers of delegation had been silenced. Therefore, this particular amendment should be passed to the Planning Committee for their deliberation and determination.

1.26 In disagreement, Mr Webb contacted his solicitor Mr Hawkins to explain what had just transgressed with "H". On 17th October 2002, Mr Hawkins sent a letter by facsimile to her on several matters regarding the application and in particular the silence of delegated powers. On 12th November 2002, "H" acknowledged the fact that the application would now go before the Planning Committee for determination, as she sent a copy of her Case Report by facsimile to Mr Hawkins. "H"'s initial actions are also contrary to further documents supplied by "I" in March 2004. A Planning Application Cover Sheet numbered 2 (Appendix 28), referring to Planning Application (DC/695/02/WOL) quite clearly shows, in "H"'s handwriting, remarks about the letters from the neighbour (Hilltop House) and the Local Parish Council. She indicates that she sent a facsimile to Mr Brown on 24th September 2002 and stated, "Application would need to go to Committee."

1.27 Therefore, it is quite evident that "H" was fully aware of the knowledge that Planning Application (DC/695/02/WOL) did indeed require reporting to the Planning Committee for their determination, in conformity with the Council’s Constitution under Article 13 - Delegated Powers to the Head of Development and Environmental Protection. Despite her knowing of the need to refer the application to the Planning Committee, she caused maladministration and injustice to Mr Webb, who had to employee the services of a Solicitor to cause her take the correct direction of the application's next course of deliberation. It is also evident that both "H" and "G" in this particular matter have not afforded Mr Webb the fairness and consistency in the treatment as an individual and was unjustified in their refusal to take the correct course of action, as per the Council’s Constitution. They have not assisted in the effective operation of the Council and inappropriately used Council resources in what can only be described as a personal vendetta against Mr Webb. They were also negligent in carrying out duties in accordance with relevant policies and procedures and displayed personal conducts of unacceptable standards.

1.28 With reference to Section 1.16 of this complaint, during the Planning Committee meeting "P" described Planning Application (DC/675/98/WOL) as "we thought that this application was dead". He continued to say that the application before the Planning Committee was "nothing more than a ploy by a solicitor to resurrect the application". A valid planning permission capable of implementation enures for the benefit of the land and cannot be abandoned by the conduct of a particular owner, or occupier of the land or the LPA. The relevant development could start many years after the grant of planning permission. To prevent unimplemented planning permissions continuing having legal force indefinitely, conditions requiring development to be begun within certain time limits are imposed by statute. Section 91 (1) of The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 provides that, subject to provisions, every planning permission granted or deemed to be granted shall be granted or, as the case maybe, be deemed to be granted, subject to the condition that the development to which it relates must be begun not later than expiration of 5 years beginning with the date on which the permission is granted, or, as the case maybe, deemed to be granted.

1.29 Condition 1 of Planning Application (DC/675/02/WOL) (Appendix 1) states, "The development to which this permission relates shall begun not later than the expiration of 5 years beginning with the date of this permission. Reason: As required by Section 91 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990." In a document supplied by "I" in March 2004 (Appendix 29), an email dated 8th July 2002 to "W" from the Managing Solicitor of the Council’s Commercial Division stated that Planning Application (DC/675/02/WOL), "� as long as the permission for the stable block has not expired, there's nothing to prevent an application to vary the conditions to which it was subject. As far as I can see, that stable permission has not expired." Hence, since the grant of permission for the stable occurred on 8th September 1998, the permission was not liable to lapse until the 7th September 2003, some 14 months later.

1.30 Therefore, it is quite evident that "P"'s comments are entirely unjustified and unwarranted, in an attempt to mislead the Planning Committee. Since Planning Application (DC/675/02/WOL) was an extant planning permission, it was not "dead" and was certainly not a ploy by Mr Webb's Solicitor "to resurrect the planning application.", as it was a valid and effective permission, as stated earlier. "P" was aware of the Council’s Commercial Solicitor comments in July 2002 and fully aware of Section 91 of The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as his role as Development Manager, prior to his comments at the meeting. As a result, "H", "G" and "P" in this particular matter have not afforded Mr Webb the fairness and consistency in the treatment as an individual and was unjustified in their handling of and their attempt of perverse reporting to the Planning Committee and acted in a manner which was contrary to the Council’s legitimate interest, as per the Council’s Constitution, that ultimately prejudiced Mr Webb's rights to a fair hearing. They have not assisted in the effective operation of the Council and inappropriately used Council resources in what can only be described as a personal vendetta against Mr Webb. They were also negligent in carrying out duties in accordance with relevant policies and procedures and displayed personal conducts of unacceptable standards.

1.31 In the LPA's Notice of Decision (Appendix 30), "H" sets out 3 Reasons for Refusal of the application are contrary to Section 73 of The Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Section 73(1) permits applications for planning permission for the development of land without complying with conditions subject to which a previous planning permission was granted. Sub-section (2) provides that on such an application, the LPA shall consider only the question of the conditions subject to which planning permission should be granted and if the they decide that planning permission should be granted subject to conditions differing from those subject to which the previous permission was granted, or that it should be granted unconditionally, they shall grant planning permission accordingly and if they decide that planning permission should be granted subject to the same conditions as those subject to which the previous permission was granted, they shall refuse the application.

1.32 Condition 5 of the original planning permission states, "The stables hereby approved shall not be used for commercial livery and will at all times remain ancillary to the enjoyment of the proposed adjoining dwelling which gained approval on 20 April 1994 (application reference 08/93/0529). Reason: To ensure the stables do not become a separate commercial undertaking which it is considered could result in additional traffic using a narrow country lane and the potential for further development in the open countryside to the detriment of the character of the area." Condition 6 states, "Work on the stables shall not be commenced until work on the dwelling approved on 20 April 1994 (application reference 08/93/0529) has also commenced. Reason: To ensure the proposed stables remain ancillary to the proposed dwelling in the curtilage of which they are to be sited." It was Mr Webb's intention to vary these conditions to make the stables ancillary to his own home at The Barns, Walk Lane, Irby upon Humber.

1.33 In her first Reason for Refusal, "H" states, "The proposed variation of the conditions 5 and 6 are considered to be unacceptable on grounds that the stables would cause a nuisance to the neighbouring occupier by reason, disturbance and smell." Having due regard for Conditions 5 and 6 in Section 2.32, this Reason for Refusal is unlawful. She has not considered the correct reasoning behind Conditions 5 and 6 and added reasons that have no relevance whatsoever to those reasons of Condition 5 and 6, as Sub-section (2) of Section 73 states the LPA shall only consider the question of those conditions (Section 2.30). Her second Reason for Refusal again is unlawful as she now considers the access to the land where the stable would be constructed. Again this Reason for Refusal has no relevance whatsoever to those of Conditions 5 and 6. Access to the land had already been discussed and approved in the original application for planning permission and was not at question in the variation of the conditions. As Mr Hawkins pointed out in his letter dated 12th November 2002 to "H", her third Reason for Refusal is irrelevant as firstly, again it has no relevance whatsoever to those reasons of Conditions 5 and 6 and secondly it is not a material planning consideration.

1.34 When considering a planning application, the Council has a duty to consider all material planning considerations relevant only to that planning application. Any matter, which is raised and is not relevant material planning considerations, must be disregarded in its entirety. The Governments 'Planning Policy Guidance 1' (PPG1) document states, "In principle ... any consideration which relates to the use and development of land is capable of being a planning consideration. Whether a particular consideration falling within that broad class is material in any given case will depend on the circumstances" (Stringer v MHLG 1971). Material considerations must be genuine planning considerations, i.e. they must be related to the purpose of planning legislation, which is to regulate the development and use of land in the public interest. The considerations must also fairly and reasonably relate to the application concerned (R v Westminster CC ex parte Monahan 1989). Much will depend on the nature of the application under consideration, the relevant policies in the development plan and the surrounding circumstances."

1.35 The Council further embraces advice given in PPG1, in Section 13.3 of their own 'Probity in Planning' document by stating, "Members and Officers should only address their minds to planning considerations and shall disregard non-planning considerations when considering applications and other planning matters."

1.36 It is quite obvious that it was "H"'s clear objective to refuse the variation of Conditions 5 and 6 within Planning Application (DC/675/02/WOL). As discussed in the latter Section, her Reasons for Refusal are unlawful. The LPA could have simply granted planning permission subject to the same conditions as those subject to which the previous permission was granted and as of a consequence would refuse the application, as per Sub-section (2) of Section 73 of The Town and Country Planning Act 1990. "H" has simply treated this application as an independent application for planning permission, as "W" had wanted to do prior to the application being accepted. In this particular matter she has abused her powers and caused maladministration and injustice.

1.37 As per North East Lincolnshire Council’s Constitution, "W", "G", "H" and "P" have brought the Council into disrepute, in this matter. The Officer's Code of Conduct states that they must act in a manner which is not contrary to the Council’s legitimate interest, in particular to report or record any matter in respect of which there is a duty to report or record, to accurately maintain those reports or documents, to act in a proper and orderly manner which would not result in an action against the Council for negligence and always act within the law on the Council’s premises. These issues alone constitute Gross Misconduct in the fact that they had negligently or willfully failed to comply with the legal requirements of the Council and legislation and/or policies contained in The Town and Country Planning Act 1990, The Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure Order) 1995, The North East Lincolnshire Council Development Control Charter and the North East Lincolnshire Council Constitution.

1.38 Section 1.16 of this complaint purports to the Council’s handling of the recorded minutes at the Planning Committee meeting. As discussed earlier, written or verbal reporting during such a meeting can weigh heavily upon an outcome of a decision. Mr Webb believes it is unfair that the Council only allow the applicant to address the Planning Committee in the first instance of the application being discussed. After the applicant's allocated time of addressing the meeting, he or she must remain silent through the remainder of that meeting. This affords a unique opportunity to Officers and Members to discuss and rebuff those comments of the Applicant with no right of reply. It also allows Officers and Members to submit further information or discuss further issues to which the applicant has not right to reply during that meeting. To speak "off the cuff" without substantial evidence in the form of background papers etc., is both unethical and prejudicial to that Applicants right to a fair hearing.

1.39 Moreover, the minutes of that meeting do no accurately reflect what was discussed not only by the applicant but also by the Officers addressing that application. As mentioned earlier, such comments can ultimately decide an application for planning permission and as such should be detailed accurately in the recording of them and placed upon the Planning Register for public scrutiny, as part of that decision. Mr Webb also believes it is improper for the Law and Democratic Service's department to offer Officers and Members at that meeting, an opportunity of changing any part of those meeting minutes to their satisfaction. If this is going to be general practice of altering meeting minutes then the Applicant's attending that meeting should be given the same right to do so.

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Investigating Officer's Findings and Conclusion

Complaint section	Findings	Action/Outcome
Section 1.18, 1.19, 1.20, 1.21 and 1.22 "W"’s delay of the planning application submission contrary to Section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, Part 1, Schedule 1 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995, the Council’s Development Control Charter, and Part 5 of the Council’s Constitution.	“This is clearly an example of an Officer giving advice without first checking, and then when that advice was challenged, not checking to ensure that the original advice given was correct. It is clear that had this matter been checked sooner an application would have been able to be registered and determined far more quickly than was the case, and as indicated in some of the other complaints, there seems to be a pattern of not checking with Legal Services soon enough.”	No action.
Section 1.23 "H"’s failure to ask for extension of time contrary to Article 20 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995, the Council’s Development Control Charter and Part 5 of the Council’s Constitution.	Not investigated.
Section 1.24 "H"’s misrepresentation of the site notice contrary to Article 6 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995 and Part 5 of the Council’s Constitution.	“There is no obvious explanation for this as the application was clearly in Mr Webb’s name with his own private address.”	No action.
Sections 1.25, 1.26 and 1.27 "H"’s disregard of the Council’s Scheme of Delegated Powers contrary to Part 5 of the Council’s Constitution.	“An element within this complaint is the initial insistence by "H" that the application would be dealt with under delegated powers which seems to been reversed when Mr Webb’s Solicitors wrote to the Local Planning Authority advising that this could not be determined under the Council’s powers of delegation.”	“This again is a matter which ought to be examined by the Council’s Solicitor.” No response.
Section 1.28 "P"’s misrepresentation of the planning application contrary to Section 91 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and Part 5 of the Council’s Constitution.	“At the time the comment had been made it appears that the matter had been checked by Legal Services and found to be a valid application, and as a result of the comment being made Mr Webb’s perception of the way he was been treated by the Planning Department could have, in my opinion, been heightened. The second comment in respect of the ploy by a solicitor does not appear to have any grounding in other than personal opinion.”	No action.
Section 1.31 "H"’s misrepresentation of the planning application contrary to Section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and Part 5 of the Council’s Constitution.	“I do not, however, consider that the decision was wrongly reached or that comments made at Committee would have influenced the ultimate decision and would consider this part of the complaint should not be upheld, particularly bearing in mind that Mr Webb had a right to an appeal, the proper way to challenge a planning decision, and did not exercise it.”	No action.
Investigating Officer's Conclusion	“There were obvious delays which could have been avoided and numerous stated levels of service by the Council which were not met. It is clear that when correspondence has been entered into, sufficient checks have not been made to ensure the information given was correct or had base in the Council’s procedures or within the legislation pertaining at the time. Mr Webb’s complaint that he was badly advised initially and that this led to delays in dealing with his application and that the Council did not deliver services in line with promised timescales.”	“I would suggest that the procedure be implemented that if an answer to a question is challenged, this matter is copied to the relevant Department to respond to, i.e. the Legal Department, so as to avoid protracted correspondence or argument over a matter of either procedure or law.” No response.

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Local Government Ombudsman’s Findings and Conclusion

Complaint section	Findings	Action/Outcome
Section 1.18, 1.19, 1.20, 1.21 and 1.22 "W"’s delay of the planning application submission contrary to Section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, Part 1, Schedule 1 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995, the Council’s Development Control Charter, and Part 5 of the Council’s Constitution.	Refused to investigate.
Section 1.23 "H"’s failure to ask for extension of time contrary to Article 20 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995, the Council’s Development Control Charter and Part 5 of the Council’s Constitution.	Refused to investigate.
Section 1.24 "H"’s misrepresentation of the site notice contrary to Article 6 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995 and Part 5 of the Council’s Constitution.	Refused to investigate.
Sections 1.25, 1.26 and 1.27 "H"’s disregard of the Council’s Scheme of Delegated Powers contrary to Part 5 of the Council’s Constitution.	Refused to investigate.
Section 1.28 "P"’s misrepresentation of the planning application contrary to Section 91 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and Part 5 of the Council’s Constitution.	Refused to investigate.
Section 1.31 "H"’s misrepresentation of the planning application contrary to Section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and Part 5 of the Council’s Constitution.	Refused to investigate.
Local Government Ombudsman’s Conclusion	“The Local Government Act 1974 says that normally the Ombudsman may not investigate a complaint unless it was made to her, or to an elected councilor, within 12 months from the day when the complainant first knew about the alleged failings which have affected him or her. This restriction applies to your complaint and, in the light of the information you have supplied, I do not see any grounds which would lead the Ombudsman to decide that she should accept the complaint now. Nor is it for the Local Government Ombudsman to question the merits of Council decisions where there is a right of appeal to a Government Minister (e.g. a Planning Inspector). This also applies to any complaint about the delay in the consideration of the planning application as a right of appeal exists against non-determination.”	No action.

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